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Over the past twenty years, South Korea has faced dramatic demographic changes. The 
demographic changes often involve three key elements—birth, death, and the movement of people—
but what is unique about the demographic trends of Korea is its exceptionally rapid pace of change. For 
example, the total fertility rate decreased from 4.5 in 1970 to 1.15 in 2004 and the Korea’s current level 
of fertility is the lowest among OECD countries (Shin, 2009: 1). As a result, Korea’s population size is 
shrinking and in 2050 its population size is predicted at 42.3 million as compared to 48.8 million in 
2010. While the number of young people decreased as a result of low birth rate, the number and 
proportion of old people over 65 years old increased as a result of low death rate: the proportion of old 
people jumped from 3.1% in 1970 to 11% in 2010 and is forecasted at 38.2% in 2050 (Korea National 
Statistical Service, 2009: 12). The combined effect of low birth and death rates was the reduction of the 
economically active population between the ages of 15 and 64. Furthermore, the improved standard of 
living of Koreans discouraged Koreans from engaging in physically demanding and low-paid jobs in 
manufacturing and personal service industries, creating labor shortage in so-called 3-D jobs. This 
prompted the admission of labor migrants from Asia’s developing countries in the late 1980s. Female 
marriage migrants joined labor migrants in increasing numbers in the early 1990s as Korean males in 
rural areas married foreign brides and when international marriage brokers began international 
matchmaking service in the early 2000s, the number of female marriage migrants grew rapidly from 
9,684 in 2000 to 30,719 in 2005 and since then declined gradually to 25,142 in 2009 (Korea National 
Statistical Office, 2010). Thus, within a span of three decades, Korea has transformed from an 
immigrant-sending country to an immigrant-receiving one. In 2010, the number of foreigners in Korea 
reached 1.2 million, accounting for 2.4% of the national population, and the proportion of foreigners is 
expected to rise up to 5% in 2020, and 9.2% in 2050 (Park et al., 2009: 1). This means South Korea is 
now entering a multicultural society. 
Korean society has responded to this unprecedented phenomenon in many fields. Korean 
scholars introduced theories and discourses of multiculturalism developed in Western societies to 
Korea and examined current situations and problems of various types of migrants. Civic organizations 
advocated rights of migrant workers and marriage migrants and supported their adjustment in Korea. 
Mass media transformed migrants’ problems into a social issue and raised public awareness of 
difficulties faced by migrants. The Korean government took proactive measures to accommodate needs 
of foreigners and migrants. Although acted rather too quickly and hastily, the central government and 
its affiliated organizations have made some remarkable accomplishments in immigration and 
multicultural policies. They include 1) establishment of the Employment Permit System and Healthy 
Family Support Centers, 2) legislation of the Foreigners Treatment Act and the Multicultural Family 
Support Act, and 3) establishment of legal and institutional infrastructures like the Korea Immigration 
Service. Also, according to many surveys on Koreans’ perceptions of migrant workers and 
multicultural society, Koreans have rather much more open-minded and positive viewpoints toward 
migrant workers, marriage migrants, and a multicultural society than ever before, and their perspectives 
are slowly but gradually changing more positively (Yoon and Song, 2010; Yoon et al., 2010). These 
changes were able to happen mainly because of many progressive civic organizations and media, 
which actively challenged infringement of human rights, social prejudices and discriminations faced by 
migrant workers, marriage migrants, and their children. They also have spotlighted the urgency of 
granting support and attention toward the groups above. Also, when Hines Ward, an African-American 
Korean who plays American football, visited South Korea, his “mother’s country,” in 2006 after he 
received the Super Bowl MVP award, discrimination problems among children of international 
marriages began to get more attention from society  (Lee and Ahn, 2007: 65-66). Moreover, as a tool 
for overcoming exclusive nationalism, the idea of multiculturalism has further accepted, and is 
regarded as synonym for liberalization or a step toward joining the ranks of advanced nations (Seol, 
2009).  
Despite such efforts and opportunities, the level of social discrimination and exclusion that 
foreigners and migrants perceive turned out to be very high. The Ministry of Culture, Sports and 
Tourism carried out a survey in April-May 2008 among 825 migrants and marriage migrants, and 102 
North Korean migrants over 20 years old. The results showed that their perceived level of 
discrimination toward migrants and/or their families was ‘rather high’ (53.3%), followed by ‘moderate 
high’ (19.2%), ‘significantly high’ (6.9%), ‘low’ (20.1%), and ‘none’ (0.5%), and that the level of 
discrimination toward North Korea migrants was ‘rather high’ (53.9%), followed by ‘moderate high’ 
(29.4%), ‘significantly high’ (2.9%), ‘low’ (11.8%), and ‘none’ (2%). Furthermore, 55.8% of the 
migrants and marriage migrants felt the need of education on multiculturalism for the general public  
while 8.4% did not, and 66.7% of North Korean migrants also felt the need of educating the public 
about North migrants’ culture and while 7.5% did not (Cho, Park, and Hong, 2008). The outsiders’ 
evaluation of Koreans’ acceptance of multiculturalism is far worse and negative than Koreans believe 
in; according to the International Institute for Management Development’s (IMD) World 
Competitiveness Index, Korea was at the bottom (out of 55 nations) in 2008, and second from the 
bottom (out of 57 nations) in 2009 (Jung, 2009). 
The negative evaluations of outsiders about Koreans’ acceptance of multiculturalism suggest 
that the transition from a hitherto mono-ethnic and mono-cultural society to a multiethnic and 
multicultural one would be a difficult and rocky journey. As Korean society has entered the first phase 
of multicultural society, Koreans need to find a new principle of social solidarity and integration in 
order to incorporate new members of Korean society who have acquired citizenship by naturalization. 
Ethnic identity and ethnic nationalism based on blood ties and common culture are no longer 
appropriate to mobilize a sense of belonging and solidarity among people of different ethnic and 
cultural backgrounds. Also, citizenship is an outdated and rigid form of social membership and 
entitlement in a multicultural society, and does not accommodate the problem of permanent residents 
and undocumented foreigners effectively. There are a significant number of foreigners who are actual 
members of local communities but denied of basic human rights because of their non-citizenship or 
undocumented statuses. 
A multicultural society is not just a place where people of different racial and ethnic 
backgrounds live together but also a place where people of different statuses and relationships cohabit.  
Here, discordance between official membership and actual membership occurs. In order for the 
majority and minority groups to coexist, it is necessary to develop a new principle of social solidarity 
and integration, and to endow socially marginalized groups with legitimate social membership and 
rights. As Kymlica (2001) defined multiculturalism as a form of politics of recognition, emphasizing 
equal rights to racial, cultural, and sexual minorities, we need to develop a more expanded social 
membership that enables peaceful coexistence between the majority and minority groups.  
In this article, I wish to examine the overall circumstances and problems of multicultural 
minority groups in Korean society, and to analyze Koreans’ perceptions of and relations with these 
groups. Also, I wish to propose an alternative principle of social solidarity and integration that can 
facilitate coexistence of majority and minority groups.  
 
II. Definition of a Multicultural Minority Group 
 
 A minority group refers to any group that is distinguished from a dominant group in terms of 
social status, race and ethnicity, education, age, sexual orientation, religion, ideology, region, wealth, 
etc. Moreover, the minority status is conditioned not only by numerical inferiority but also by political, 
social, and economical powers. Dworkin and Dworkin (1999) offer a definition of a minority group as 
a group characterized by these four qualities: 1) Identifiability—the group can be distinguished from 
dominant societal members by any number of factors, including physical traits or cultural practices, 2) 
Differential Power—on average the minority group members (in comparison with members of the 
majority group) have less power, fewer resources, and are less able to mobilize the resources to get 
their way in the presence of opposition, 3) Differential and Pejorative Treatment—these are the 
behaviors of the dominant group in their dealing with the minority, and specifically refer to 
discriminations toward a specific person due to his or her membership of certain minority group, and 4) 
Group Awareness—minorities are often reminded of their low status and have developed an identity. 
This often has led to a sense of greater solidarity in the struggles engaged in by members of their group 
as they have combated long periods of discriminatory treatment. 
 Though the term ‘minority’ is more suitable for multiracial or multinational societies like the 
United States, as there are increasing number of socially marginalized groups in Korea, minorities in 
Korean society can be also defined as above. North Korean migrants, the disabled, marriage migrants, 
homosexuals, and more, represent quickly evolving aspects of Korea. They all are generally 
recognizable as distinct from the majority group, and at the same time they are given less or no 
political, economic, and social powers, which often become targets for persisting discrimination. Since 
the 1990s there has been a great increase in numbers of minority-focused social organizations, and their 
growth has been deeply related to strengthening their group solidarity. In May 2001, for example, the 
National Human Rights Commission Act was passed and it applies to all citizens of Korea and all 
foreigners residing therein. Also, this act prohibits any discriminatory actions that violate equality 
based on one’s social status, race, sexual orientation, disability, etc. This again provides evidences of 
regarding North Korean migrants, the disabled, migrant workers, and homosexuals as minorities in 
Korea. 
In a multicultural society one’s race, ethnicity, nationality, or culture are more salient 
markers than sex, age, sexual orientation, disability, or region when defining him or her as a minority. I 
refer groups of people with such characteristics as multicultural minority groups. At the present time in 
Korean society, migrant workers, marriage migrants, children of international marriages, Korean 
Chinese or ethnic Koreans of Chinese nationality, overseas Chinese, and North Korean migrants are the 
most representative multicultural minority groups. Yet, whether to or not to view North Korean 
migrants as a multicultural minority group still remains an open question. Most North Korean migrants 
and civic activists who work for them oppose the idea of multiculturalism because North Korean 
migrants are Koreans from birth and deserve special treatment. Scholars and civic activists who work 
for immigrants and their children, on the other hand, think that it is no wrong to view North Korean 
migrants as a multicultural minority group because they are migrants who came from different 
backgrounds from South Korea and have to adapt to new environments like other foreign migrants. I 
agree with the latter viewpoint and will examine their living conditions and relations with South 
Koreans in comparison with other multicultural minority groups. 
The multicultural minority groups listed above are differentiated from each other according 
to their nationality, compatriot status, and legal status. Picture 1 shows the position of multicultural 
minority groups arranged among the dimensions of nationality, compatriot status, and legal status. 
North Korean migrants belong to the right upper part, where Korean nationality and compatriot status 
fit in together, and therefore they get special treatments for they are innate Koreans and expected to 
play important roles in the process of unification. In the right lower part, where non-Korean nationality 
and compatriot status fit in together, ethnic Koreans in China, Russia, and other overseas Koreans are 
located. Here, though they are not Korean nationals, they are given extra care and attention often based 
on brotherly or fraternal love. The left upper part, where Korean nationality and non-compatriot status 
overlaps, belongs to the naturalized-marriage migrants. They have acquired Korean nationality through 
marriage and are expected to continue family lineage by giving birth to the next generation. These 
marriage migrants and Korean husbands form multicultural families, and their children—who are full 
citizens—also receive special attention and support, especially in education. Last but not least, the left 
lower part, where non-Korean nationality and non-compatriot status overlap, belongs to ethnic Chinese 
in Korea and migrant workers. Although ethnic Chinese have been long-time permanent residents 
living in Korea for several generations, they are treated as ‘half-citizens’ (H. Kim, 2006). Migrant 
workers are non-citizens, non-overseas Koreans, and remain temporal residents in Korea. Thus, they 
receive much less attention and this small attention gets further divided based upon their legal status. 
Legal migrant workers are somewhat protected through Foreign Workers Employment Law and 
Foreigners Treatment Act, while illegal (or undocumented) migrant workers are excluded from any 
forms of legal protections, and therefore, are put in a very difficult situation.  
Co m patriotsNo n-Co m patr iots
Nationals
No n-n atio nals
Legal fo reigners
Illeg al foreign ers
•North  Ko rean m igrants
•Ch ildren of in ternati onal 
m arr iag e
•Overseas Koreans
•Natural ized m arriage
m igrants
•Eth nic Ch inese







•Il legal m ig rant
workers
 
<Figure 1> Koreans’ cognitive schema of immigrants 
 
III. Current Situations of Multicultural Minority Groups 
 




 The influx of foreign migrant workers1 has started after facing a significant labor shortage in 
the domestic labor market in 1987. Since 1987, large-scale massive labor movements occurred, and 
therefore, quickly increased laborers’ wages. Moreover, as the overall living standards of Koreans 
improved, Korean laborers gradually began to avoid difficult, dangerous, and dirty occupations. As a 
result, the labor shortage of manufacturing and construction industries has got dramatically serious. 
From late-1992, as the use of migrant workers was legalized, many overseas investment enterprises 
that have overseas branches started to admit migrant workers. Furthermore, starting from November 
1993, migrant workers entered Korea more easily through the introduction of the Foreign Industrial 
Trainee that various industrial organizations, such as Korea Federation of Small and Medium Business, 
National Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives, and Construction Association of Korea, have 
implemented. Also, the number of migrant workers gaining illegal access to jobs in Korea by entering 
with tourist visas increased. The number of migrant workers in 1991 was 45,449 and it quickly 
increased to 140,000 by 1995. Though the number slightly decreased in the 1997 financial crisis, as the 
economy quickly recovered, the number bounced to 258,866 by July 2000. This number represented 
about 1.2% of Korea’s employees, 1.9% of wage earners, and has continuously increased up to 551,858 
by December 2009.  
 
2) Demography and Characteristics 
 
 As the number of migrant workers increased, nationalities of migrant workers also got diverse. 
Prior to 2003, migrant workers came from 90 different nations but the number of nations constantly 
increased to 120 by 2007. In early 1990s, major migrant worker sending nations were China, the 
Philippines, and Bangladesh, but further expanded to Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, Mongolia, 
Uzbekistan, etc. However, Korean Chinese still make up 55.5% of the migrant worker population, 
followed by Southeast Asians 25%, Han Chinese 3.4%, Central Asian 2.4%, and Mongolian 2.3% 
(Korean Immigration Service, 2009b). From 1997 to 2008, the number of female migrant workers has 
been remained low, around 31%, when compared to other labor importing countries. However, since 
2002, Korean Chinese were allowed to work in the service industry and this preferential arrangement 
                                                        
1 Foreign migrant workers will be further referred as migrant workers 
increased the percentage of female migrant workers in the total migrant worker population because 
females are as highly represented as 44.6% in the Korean Chinese population. 
 The migrant workers’ occupational ranges expanded further as well. According to the 
statistics of the Ministry of Justice, the number of migrant workers working in the professional fields, 
such as teaching and research, English lessons, skill training, and entertainment, etc, were 15,900 in 
1997; this number has further increased to 40,698 in 2009 (Korea Immigration Service, 2009). Also, 
migrant workers from Nigeria, Ghana and other African countries have altered their careers to 
international trades especially between Korea and their countries, or have established themselves as 
entrepreneurs. However, their population is significantly low; 6.6% as professionals and 0.8% as artists 
and sportsmen, and the majority of migrant workers remain as low-skilled laborers. Also, out of the 
total migrant worker population, 8.7% (48,029) are undocumented immigrants and, again they mostly 
work for low-skilled jobs (Korea Immigration Service, 2009). In short, the migrant workers can be 
largely divided into four main categories: 1) professional workers, 2) non-professional workers who 
come under the Employment Permit System and work in manufacturing industries, 3) overseas 
Koreans with Working Visit Visa, and 4) undocumented migrant workers. Except the professional 
workers, the rest types of migrant workers, largely low-skilled working in manufacturing, construction, 
and personal service industries, constitute multicultural minority groups in Korean society (Seol, 2009b: 
64).  
 Furthermore, as the number of migrant workers who are staying longer periods in Korea 
increased, they have created themselves group residences or ethnic communities. Wongok-dong in 
Ansan and Garibong-dong in Seoul are the popular examples of local communities where Koreans and 
migrant workers reside together. According to the 2009 survey of foreign residents administered by the 
Ministry of Public Administration and Security, 35.7% of migrant workers reside in Gyeonggi 
Province, 29.6% in Seoul, 6.6% in Gyeongnam Province, and 5.7% in Incheon. When compared to the 
2008 survey, the migrant worker population in Seoul and Chungnam Province increased dramatically 
by 57.8% and 93%, respectively. Seventy percent of the migrant workers are residing in the capital 
areas because most businesses and companies are located there (Ministry of Public Administration and 
Security, 2009).  
 
3) Current Situations and Problems 
  In January 2007, the Industrial Training System was abolished and the Employment Permit 
System was implemented instead. The new system of foreign labor management was revised in April 
2010 and the revision offers: 1) long-term labor contracts, 2) extension of length of employment from 
three to five years, 3) increased flexibility in the change of workplace, 4) longer period allowed for 
searching for a new employer after the change of workplace, and 5) overall better working conditions. 
However, this revision is being criticized by civic activists for being advantageous to employers and 
for not considering migrant workers’ basic human rights. In other words, with migrant workers not 
given full details and information on their occupation and workplace environment and by just 
extending terms of contract can restrict workers’ autonomous decision making process. Furthermore, 
the right to rehire migrant workers solely resides within the employers, and therefore, when workers’ 
three years of employment contract expires, the employers are most likely to take control over the 
migrant workers and even their amount of wages. Also, even if more legitimate reasons for changing 
workplaces were added, the system is criticized for severely restricting the workers’ rights to change 
workplaces and thereby keeping them under the condition of low wage and subordinate employment 
(H. Kim, 2008: 290-294; Y. Kim, 2009: 128-129).  
 Further related problems with migration workers are: 1) exceedingly expensive referral fees, 
2) differences of terms in contract and reality, 3) long working hours and low wages, 4) overdue wages, 
5) industrial accidents and lack of safety education, 6) verbal abuse and discriminative treatments, 7) 
vulnerability to diseases, injuries, and mental stresses, 8) exclusion from public social welfare and 
medical check-ups, and 9) violation of human rights of detained migrant workers at the Foreigners 
Detention Center  (Han and Seol, 2007: 57-58; J. Song, 2006: 41-45; Lee and Jang, 2008: 247-248; 
Joint Committee with Migrants in Korea, 2009: 3-5). For legal migrant workers, their priority 
predicaments are focused on mental issues, while personal liberty and human rights, overdue wage, and 
other financial issues remain as key problems for the documented migrant workers. They are also faced 
with fear of regulation and exportation.  
According to statistics on medical care for industrial accidents released in 2009 by the Korea 
Occupational Safety & Health Agency, migrant workers are facing greater difficulties related to 
industrial accidents as years go by. The numbers increased gradually—3,406 (3,312 injured and 94 
dead) in 2006, 3,967 (3,880 injured and 87 dead) in 2007, and 5,221 (5,114 injured and 117 dead) in 
2008 (Seol, 2009a: 170-175). In daily lives, they also face great amount of difficulties; they have 
troubles with the Korean language and culture and face discrimination because of their backgrounds 
(especially when they come from developing countries) and colored race. They also have difficulties 
with food and lack of spaces to carry out religious practices. Furthermore, exclusion from medical and 
social benefits, poor residential and education environment for themselves and their children, and lack 
of legal protections are also their key problems while living in Korea. Last but not least, being unable 
to communicate well in Korean, they are vulnerable to accidents and minor disputes can lead up to 
racial conflicts (Seol, Choi, and Han, 2002: 93-103; Yoon, Park, and Kwon, 2005: 240-246; Gyeonggi 
Resesarch Institute, 2006: 208-210).  
 




 The history of international marriages in Korea goes back up to the Korean War. In order to 
block the expansion of communism in the Northeast Asia after the war, 40,000 American soldiers were 
stationed each year. From 1950 to 1964, about 6,000 Korean women were married to American 
soldiers and moved to the United States. But, gradually, the number of Korean women who emigrated 
overseas for the purpose of marriage decreased; the number dropped to 6,187 in 1981 and further to 
1,113 in 2003. However, the turning point of international marriages occurred in the early 1992. As the 
diplomatic relations between Korea and China were established, Korean bachelors in rural areas 
married female Korean Chinese, and from then, the number of Korean Chinese increased. Furthermore, 
Japanese and Filipino women entered Korea to get married as well, with religious purposes emphasized 
under the Unification Church. In 2000, the international marriage occurred more frequently after the 
introduction of marriage broker systems and businesses. The foreign brides started to come from the 
Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Mongolia, Russia, Uzbekistan, etc., and especially the number of 
Vietnamese brides increased significantly after the year 2003. It is reported that in the year 1990, 1.2% 
of all marriages in Korea were international marriages, which later has increased to 13.6% by 2005 and 
slightly decreased to 11% by 2008.  
 
2) Demography and Characteristics 
 
 According to statistics released  in February 2010 by Korea Immigration Service, the total 
number of marriage migrants in Korea was 134,426, with 117,148 being females (87.2%) and 17,278 
males (12.8%). Out of the total number of foreign brides in Korea, the majority are from East Asia and 
Southeast Asia, with 30,756 Chinese (26.3%), 30,773 Vietnamese (26.3%), 25,783 Korean Chinese 
(22%), 9,210 Japanese (7.9%), 6,406 Filipinas (5.5%), 3,395 Cambodians (2.9%), 2,381 Thais (2%), 
2,373 Mongolians (2%), and 6,071 from other nations (5.2%).  
 A recent survey of marriage immigrants and their families conducted by the Ministry of 
Health and Welfare from July 20 to October 31 in 2009 that interviewed 131,000 marriage migrants 
and 73,000 families provides concrete information about this group. Main results are: 1) 54% of all 
marriage migrants entered Korea after 2005, confirming the recency of their arrival, 2) the average 
period of residence was 5.3 years (5.1 years for women and 7.1 years for men), and 3) 51.9% of 
marriage migrants resided in Seoul and Gyeonggi Province, which constitutes capital area, and other 
metropolitan areas, and women had higher ratio of residing in rural areas than men (Ministry of Health 
and Welfare, 2009).  
 Most female migrants were in her twenties (average age was 23.3 years old) while male 
migrants were in his late-thirties or forties (average age was 41.6 years old). The age gap between 
female marriage migrants and Korean husbands was ten years while the gap between male marriage 
migrants and Korean wives was 1.3 years. The age gap was the widest among Cambodians and 
Vietnamese—17.5 years between Cambodian-Korean couples and 17 years between Vietnamese-
Korean couples.  
 The education level of female marriage migrants were generally low—36.1% less than high 
school education, 42.3% high-school education, 20.6% college education. On the other hand, the 
education level of male marriage migrants was higher; 24.3% received less than high school education, 
34.5% were high school graduates and 40.1% were college graduates. The education level also varied 
among different nationalities; 93.9% of marriage migrants from North America, Western Europe and 
Australia, 61.3% of Mongolians, 60.5% of Japanese, and 57.5% of Filipinas received college degrees 
while the majority of Cambodian (66.4%), Vietnamese (61.8%), and Chinese, including the Han-raced 
Chinese (36.8%), marriage migrants received less than high school education. Furthermore, 51% of 
female marriage migrants with less than elementary education got married to husbands with less or 
higher high school education, which presents another huge educational level gap.  
  
3) Current Situations and Problems 
 
 Most female marriage migrants face serious economic difficulties in Korea. According to the 
2009 survey of multicultural families, 38.4% of the interviewed families earned less than 1~2 million 
won (approximately $862~$1,724) per month, and 21.3% earned even smaller income of less than 1 
million. Only 2% earned more than 5 million won ($4,310) of monthly family income. Because of 
financial difficulties, the families that failed to pay medical insurance bills or utilities bills, borrowed 
loans for living expenses, or suspended or gave up medical treatment accounted for 30% of all 
interviewed families (Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2009).  
 The most frequently reported difficulties include 1) language barriers, 2) financial insecurity 
and limited access to social services, and 3) difficulties with educating and raising children. Especially, 
those with children at the ages of elementary school have extra difficulties of paying tuition fees for 
private educational institutes and helping school homework. They also report high levels of perceived 
discrimination—34.8% of female marriage migrants and 52.8% of male marriage migrants replied that 
they have experienced social marginalization and discrimination because of their foreign statuses and 
physical appearances. This result confirms that social prejudice and discrimination still exist toward 
marriage migrants despite the apparently growing public acceptance of multiculturalism. 
 However, the marriage migrants’ overall life satisfaction turned out to be high—57% of 
female marriage migrants and 53.8% of male marriage migrants replied satisfactory to their current 
lives. Only 6.7% of female marriage migrants and 8.3% of male marriage migrants replied negatively 
toward their living conditions in Korea. There was also a noticeable variation among people of 
different nationalities. North American, Australian, Western European and Cambodian, Thai, and 
Vietnamese marriage migrants expressed high levels of life satisfaction while Japanese marriage 
migrants reported the lowest level of satisfaction. Satisfaction with family relations was also reported 
to be high—74.8% of the marriage migrants replied they were satisfied with their spouses, 88.1% with 
their children, 64.8% with their parents-in-law, and 60.1% with siblings of their spouses.  
 Although the survey results showed high levels of satisfaction with overall life conditions and 
family relations, the stability of international marriage is known to be weak and fragile. The husbands’ 
economic incompetence, domestic violence, and language and cultural barriers are hard to overcome 
and many international marriages have come to an end. According to divorce statistics released in April, 
2010 by Statistics Korea (2010: 2-3), the number of divorces filed for international marriages increased 
rapidly from 1,744 in 2002 to 4,171 in 2005 and to 11,692 in 2009. By contrast, divorce cases of 
ordinary Korean couples decreased from 144,900 in 2002 to 124,000 in 2009. 
 




 In recent years, the number of international marriages has increased dramatically and with it, 
the number of children of immigrant families has also escalated. They used to be called ‘the racially-
mixed’ or ‘children of mixed-blood’ but those terms were replaced by ‘children of multicultural family’ 
that are thought to give a more positive meaning and connotation. The boundary of children of 
multicultural family has been open to debate among researchers, government officials, civic activists, 
and immigrants themselves. The experts on multicultural education generally include children of 
migrant workers, marriage migrants, and North Korean migrants in the broad category of multicultural 
family, but as mentioned earlier North Korean migrants do not want to be categorized together along 
with other migrants. 
 Migrant worker families are mostly comprised of non-citizen parents while marriage migrant 
families are often comprised of one parent with foreign citizenship and the other with Korean 
citizenship. Children of migrant workers were either born in Korea or moved to Korea at an early age. 
Among these children, they can be further differentiated through their parents’ legal statuses. Therefore, 
children of legal migrant families are legally protected whereas children of undocumented migrant 
families are left vulnerable, with little legal protection of basic human rights and educational support.  
 
2) Demography and Characteristics 
 
 As reported by the annual surveys of foreign residents conducted by Ministry of Public 
Administration and Security, the number of children of multicultural family has been gradually 
increasing—25,000 in 2006, 44,000 in 2007, 58,000 in 2008, and 107,689 in 2009. Ethnic backgrounds 
of the parents are diverse but the largest ethnic group is non-Korean Chinese (50.7%) followed by 
Southeast Asians (34.9%), Korean Chinese (17.3%), Japanese (6.3%), Mongolians (1.6%), and Central 
Asians (1.5%). 
In terms of age distribution, these children are concentrated in the pre-school ages and 
elementary school ages—64,040 under the age of six and 28,922 in the 7-12 age bracket as compared 
to 8,082 in the middle school ages and 6,645 in the high school ages. As a result, the current issues are 
more focused toward family and schools, within ten years, however, issues of labor, poverty, 
discrimination and other socioeconomic problems will begin to surface and become important sources 
of social conflicts and divisions. 
  
3) Current Situations and Problems  
 
 The children of multicultural family have different appearances, ways of speaking, and poor 
language proficiency when compared to native Korean children, and are often alienated from the 
mainstream South Korean culture and their peers at school. This, therefore, intimates them mentally 
and creates difficulties for them in establishing self-identity as Koreans (J. Kim et al., 2005; Bae, 2006). 
These problems get further serious and affect children more critically once they are proceeding to 
secondary level of education; the number of students who dropout or discontinue the pursuit of 
education gets higher— 14% of multicultural family children do not attend elementary school, 40% do 
not attend middle school, and 70% do not complete high school.  
 According to Cho (2006), who investigated the situations of the children of multicultural 
family, children of marriage migrants are referred as ‘falling-behind children,’ children of migrant 
workers as ‘neglected children,’ and children of North Korean migrants as ‘drop-out children’ when 
evaluating each groups’ educational problems. About 8,000 children of migrant workers are not 
receiving any types of education, and moreover, undocumented migrant parents hesitate sending their 
children to public or accredited schools because of unstable residence and financial insecurities, and 
fear of disclosing their identities. On the other hand, the children of marriage migrants and North 
Korean migrants are Korean citizens and are regarded disadvantaged minorities, and therefore, receive 
further attention and double support from the government and civil organizations. Although these 
children suffer from difficulties in following Korean curriculum at school, but it is true that they are 
offered better support, such as guaranteed educational opportunities and access to other programs 
carried out by the government and civic organizations to improve educational performance. Children of 
migrant workers, especially undocumented ones, however, are neglected and abandoned from basic 
public education because they are not Korean citizens and compatriots.   
 




Korean Chinese share the same race or bloodline as Koreans but hold China citizenship. 
Korean Chinese were not allowed visiting Korea during the Cold War era, and therefore, maintained 
close relationship with North Korea instead. However, the presence of Korean Chinese was 
intermittently introduced in Korea since 1970. From 1973, letters from Korean Chinese were delivered 
through other nations, and from 1974, their presence has got more popular after the letter exchanges 
between Korea and other communist nations were allowed. Moreover, after Korea Broadcasting 
System (KBS) radio launched a campaign for reunion of dispersed family members of ethnic Koreans 
in China, they started to visit Korea through layovers at Hong Kong. Their visits and entries got further 
increased after the establishment of diplomatic relations, which legalized their entrance to Korea in 
1992 (Han and Kwon, 1993: 4; Noh, 2001: 16; Lee and Park, 2009: 104). 
The waves of Korean Chinese to Korea can be largely differentiated into two types by their 
purpose of visit. During the first wave, from the mid-1980s to early 1990s, mostly the first and second 
generation Korean Chinese came to visit their family or relatives in Korea. Their visits were 
coordinated very well both internally and externally where the family or relatives in Korea were 
financially well supported and the Korean government’s international policies supported and 
encouraged Korean Chinese’s visits (Yeo, 2005: 252-253). 
During the second wave, from mid-1990s until now, most of Korean Chinese coming to Korea 
have had, and still have, the purpose of finding employment and permanent residence. This 
phenomenon is the product of both a pull factor in Korea, which attracted migrant workers to fill in 
labor shortage, and a push factor in China that drove out Korean Chinese overseas, who were alienated 
from China’s Reform and Open-Door Policy (Noh, 2001: 16-18; Im, 2004: 19-22; Yeo, 2005: 253-254). 
Korean Chinese have utilized such various routes and mechanisms to enter Korea for 
employment purposes as industrial technical training, visit to family members, invitation of parents, 
and marriage to Koreans. Furthermore, the government offered various support and special treatments, 
and the implementation of the Working Visit Visa System in 2007 has further attracted Korean Chinese, 
even the ones who were not interested in coming to Korea (H. Kim, 2009: 38). Also, the number of 
Korean Chinese students has gradually increased since 2000 as Korean colleges and universities 
opened their doors more widely than before to foreign students. Similarly, Korean Chinese women 
started entering Korea in increasing numbers as provincial governments that experienced depopulation 
in their areas sponsored marriage between Korean men and Korean Chinese women (H. Kim, 2008: 
45). 
 
2) Demography and Characteristics 
 
After the establishment of diplomatic relations between Korea and China in 1992, Korean 
Chinese are the largest foreigner group who entered Korea in search of ‘Korean Dream.’ They are 
hired in such various industries and occupations as manufacturing, construction, restaurants, nannies, 
housekeepers, and more. According to the 2009 survey of foreign residents, Korean Chinese accounted 
for 40.1% (443,836) of all foreign residents (including undocumented ones). Furthermore, their size is 
growing as the annual number of entrants keeps increasing—65,000 in 2006, 182,000 in 2007, 256,000 
in 2008, and 270,000 in 2009 (Korea Immigration Service, 2010). As explained earlier, the Working 
Visit Visa System that has got implemented in March 2007 has greatly increased the number of Korean 
Chinese entering Korea. By February 2010, Korean Chinese currently registered under the Working 
Visit Visa System was 300,000, which was 82.4% of all Korean Chinese in Korea. There are also more 
than 3,000 Korean Chinese international students and more than 33,000 marriage migrants who 
increase the complexity of the Korean Chinese population in Korea (Korea Immigration Service, 2010).  
Like other migrant workers, Korean Chinese are heavily concentrated in Seoul and adjacent 
metropolitan areas where industrial complexes, firms, and schools are located. Especially, Kuro-gu 
Garibong-dong (32,000) and Yongdongpo Daerim-dong (41,000) are well-known inner-city ethnic 
places of Korean Chinese where they established numerous stores, associations, and close social 
networks that stretch to China and Japan (Piao, 2008).  






Korean Chinese are a minority group that has multiple identities such as Korean compatriots, 
Chinese citizens, foreign migrant workers, and marriage migrants. They share the same language, 
lifestyle and cultures with native Koreans, and their identities are closely knit with Korean history. 
These close connections as ‘compatriots’ often bring Korean Chinese and Koreans closer. However, 
though Korean Chinese seem to occupy privileged positions in Korea compared to other migrant 
worker groups, they are equally low-skilled workers and clustered at the lower classes. They are like 
‘marginal men’ who frequently cross the border of compatriots and foreigners (M. Kim, 2003: 184; 
Yeo, 2005: 245-246).  
Not only Korean Chinese believe that their adjustment to Korea will be rather easy for they 
share similar appearances, language, and cultures with Koreans, but they also seek for vague 
compensation or support from Korea for having their ancestors who fought for independence from 
Japanese colonial rule (Noh, 2001: 29; Moon, 2008: 138). However, in reality, they face many 
differences in language, food and life styles, social norms, and political views from Koreans that often 
hinder their adaptation to Korean society. Furthermore, as they realize their current statuses as 
undocumented foreigners and lower classes in Korea, their initial expectations of being treated equally 
as compatriots shattered. Their sense of mistrust and dissatisfaction increased further as they 
experienced mistreatment and discrimination in the labor market and interpersonal relations with 
Koreans (Noh, 2001: 32-42).  
As Korean Chinese’s negative views toward Korea and Koreans get worse, the views of 
Koreans toward Korean Chinese are getting also worsened. Especially, crimes committed by 
undocumented ones turned previously sympathetic views of Koreans into negative and suspicious ones. 
In some industries like construction, competition between Korean Chinese and Korean workers 
reached a serious level so that some dissatisfied Korean organized anti-Korean Chinese rallies and 
pressured the government to restrict the entry of Korean Chinese into the construction industry. 
 




 The history of overseas Chinese in Korea dates back to 1882, when the Imo Incident occurred 
and a commercial treaty between Chosun Dynasty and Qing Dynasty was signed. This treaty was 
signed in order to strengthen Qing’s economic power over Chosun dynasty, which eventually 
facilitated commercial trades between the two. For an example, an overseas Chinese businessman 
named Dong-Soon Tae was successful in running a trading company in Chosun (Chung, 2007: 19). 
However, after the Sino-Japanese War and Russo-Japanese War, which both Japan won, Japan took 
exclusive domination over Chosun, and therefore, took over overseas Chinese businessmen’s privileges 
and implemented policies unfavorable toward them. Many powerful oversea Chinese businessmen 
moved back to China, yet a small number of overseas Chinese businessmen gradually came to Korea 
avoiding civil wars and economic crises in China (Jeon, 2003: 384). Aside to the influx of businessmen, 
a lot of workers and laborers also came from China in this period; in 1922, 50% (15,833) of all 
overseas Chinese in Korea were laborers (Park, 1981: 112). 
 The overseas Chinese’s history of ordeals started from the Japanese colonial era. The ‘Manbo 
Mountain Incident,’ which happened at the Manbo mountain region of Changchun, Jilin Province in 
1931, refers to Japan’s forced relocation of Chosun people in northeastern districts of China for the 
development of farmland and irrigation canal construction, and conflicts occurred between Chosun 
farmers and Chinese farmers. Although there were no casualties, in order to drive a wedge between the 
two groups, Japan spread false reports or rumors that numerous Chosun farmers were killed. The upset 
Chosun farmers started to rebel against the overseas Chinese merchants in Chosun, by setting fires to 
many Chinese stores and houses, beating and slaughtering. After this incident, the impact has also 
affected overseas Chinese in Korea; a lot of overseas Chinese lost their grounds in Korea (Han, 2010). 
 After the liberation from Japan’s colonialism, the overseas Chinese businessmen re-grasped 
power in trading and commercial industries, but they were once again limited by strong restrictions and 
policies on foreigners’ rights implemented by President Lee and President Park administrations (Jang, 
2004). During President Lee’s administration, the immigration of Chinese was almost stopped in 1948, 
and caused more economic damage toward overseas Chinese’s businesses by severed diplomatic 
relations between the two countries in 1949. President Park’s administration took a much tighter rein 
on them; the government prohibited overseas Chinese from owning lands, and limited their amount of 
available wealth2 (Park, 2004).  Due to too strict restrictions, many overseas Chinese migrated to other 
nations, such as the United States and Taiwan, and starting from 1972, their numbers started to 
decrease gradually. 
 Yet, through the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Korea and 
increased effort and attention toward overseas Chinese and their capital in 1990s and 2000s3, Korea is 
expected to present a positive and opportunistic turning point for overseas Chinese societies in Korea. 
It can be said that the future of overseas Chinese are in the hands of an active intermediary that 
connects rising China and Korea together.  
 
2) Demography and Characteristics 
 As the additional immigration from China has been hindered after the liberation from Japan’s 
colonization, the population increase of overseas Chinese fully depended on biological reproduction. 
The population of overseas Chinese in 1945 was 12,648, and has increased up to 33,000 in 1972. 
However, this number gradually decreased back to 21,782 by 2002. By 2009, permanently residing 
overseas Chinese were about 19,539 (permanent residency and F-2 resident visa holders included), and 
were mostly from Shandong Province and their descendants, commonly carrying Taiwan citizenship. 
The gender distribution of overseas Chinese is 55% of males and 45% of females. Geographically, 40% 
of them are residing in Seoul, followed by 13% in Incheon, 11% in Gyeonggi-do, and 9% in Busan. 
Moreover, about 40% of the population are under age of 30, and 13% are over age of 61, which shows 
serious aging of the population.  
 Due to long period of experiencing social discrimination, the economic activities of overseas 
Chinese are limited, and are often focused on self-employed businesses that are medium or small-sized. 
                                                        
2 The overseas Chinese were only allowed to have one house that is smaller than 661 ㎡, one store or 
shop that is smaller than 165 ㎡, and could not rent their properties to others. 
3 There has been increased interest in creating Chinatowns in Incheon and other many metropolitan 
areas, and permanent residency system and Framework Act on Treatment of Foreigners Residing in the 
Republic of Korea have been implemented in the 2000s.  
Measured in 1994, the detailed numbers of overseas Chinese owned businesses were: 1,378 restaurants, 
317 oriental medical clinics, 165 western medical clinics, 165 Chinese grocery businesses, 103 
pharmacies, 98 tailor shops, 84 silk shops, 76 trading companies, 38 food processing businesses, and 
209 miscellaneous jobs (such as photo studios, billiard saloon, etc.) (J. Lee, 2008: 258). 
 
3) Current Situations and Problems  
 
 Most of overseas Chinese carry Taiwan citizenships, and therefore, have to register 
themselves as foreigners while in Korea. Before until the permanent residency system did not get 
implemented, overseas Chinese were given the Residential Qualification (F-2 visa). Although the visa 
recognizes his or her long-term stay, the overseas Chinese had to renew the visa regularly, and if they 
violate the regulations, they could be deported. However, the inconvenience of renewing visas and the 
risk of deportation were minimized by granting permanent residency to overseas Chinese with F-2 
visas and their children with F-5 visas, who legally reside in Korea more than 5 years. Furthermore, 
they were given rights, same as Korean citizens, to property transact, financial activities, and education 
for their children (Jang, 2004: 266). 
 Yet, the overseas Chinese still suffer from discrimination and many other disadvantages. 
Instead of social security numbers, they were given foreign registration numbers, which often cannot 
prove their identification on online services and other financial activities, such as opening a credit card. 
Furthermore, the Special Admission System for Foreigners is applied to the students, who graduated 
from overseas Chinese school, when applying to colleges; however, it does not apply to the students 
with Korean mother for his or her parents are not both foreigners. In order to send their children to 
colleges, there are many instances of Korean mothers renouncing Korean citizenship or forging divorce 
agreements (Park, 2006: 128). Moreover, the overseas Chinese pay their taxes but yet still excluded 
from receiving welfare benefits. The disabled, low-SES families, and elders are also excluded from 
receiving the government’s Livelihood Subsidy because of their foreign statuses.  
 The overseas Chinese are focused on certain types of business; more than 50% of overseas 
Chinese are engaged in restaurant businesses, and other businesses such as grocery stores, furniture, 
Chinese medicine, and self-employed businesses. When compared to the past, their choice of 
occupations got more diverse nowadays, but yet still remains limited and face significant level of 
discrimination at workplace (Park and Jang, 2003: 47-50). According to the Immigration Control Law, 
there are no restrictions on becoming government officials or professionals, but it is almost practically 
impossible for them to become one of them. Even if they get hired, the jobs are mostly related to 
Chinese and are less likely to get promoted. 
 In social and cultural perspectives, there has been great decline in overseas Chinese schools 
and overseas Chinese association, which resulted in hardship of maintaining ethnic identity and 
overseas Chinese communities together. The schools are experiencing significant drop in number of 
students and deficits, which results poor quality of education and education environments. In 1974, 
there were 50 overseas Chinese elementary schools and 5 middle/high schools nation-wide, but now 
the total number of schools have dropped to 18 (Park, 2008: 175). This goes same with the situation of 
overseas Chinese association; there is little remaining more than a name, producing no valuable 
supports or carrying out proper functions.  
 
 




 Until the end of Cold War era, North Korean migrants were regarded as ‘defected soldier,’ 
and as political logic out-ruled economic logic, they received special treatments in Korea. They were 
great examples of showing the superiority of the South Korean government and its systems, and 
therefore, experienced no hard-times, socially and financially, in adapting into Korean societies (Yoon, 
2009: 19). 
 After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, many North 
Korean students, diplomats, trade-workers, and prominent figures who were mostly out of North Korea, 
sought asylum in Korea instead of returning to North Korea. About ten of them exiled to Korea each 
year until 1993, and they were able to adjust fast into Korean societies through generous re-settlement 
funds, and their high educational level and socio-economic statuses (Yoon, 2009: 20).  
 After the death of Kim Il-Sung in 1994 and disastrous flood that occurred in 1995, significant 
number of North Koreans migrated with economic (survival) motives rather than political motives. 
This number increased after the worsening food crisis in mid-1990s, which caused North Koreans to go 
to China or other third countries first and finally migrate to Korea. In 1995, there were only 41 North 
Korean migrants, which later rapidly increased to 312 in 1999. The North Korean migrants who 
migrated during this period were mostly lower class industrial workers, farmers, low-level military 
officers, students, housewives, and the unemployed. In order to prepare for the mass defection from 
North Korea, the Protection and Resettlement Aid Act for Defecting North Korean Residents was 
passed and encouraged systematic support policies in 1997. Along with the passage of this law, the 
North Koreans who sought refugees in Korea were officially titled as ‘North Korean Defecting 
Residents’. However, the media and Koreans commonly refer North Korean migrants as ‘defectors.’ 
 After the year 2000, the number of North Korean migrants rapidly grew through the 
appearance of brokerage system, family invitation, and increased chain migration pattern. In 2000, 
there were 312 North Korean migrants, followed by 583 in 2001, 1,141 in 2002. This number gradually 
increased, although it faced a slight decrease in the year 2005, to 2,109 in 2006. The evident 
characteristics of these migrants are that there are higher percentage of women and family, and that 
their motives are more (and getting more) focused on pursuit of better life rather than survival (Lee et 
al., 2003: 56). Furthermore, more North Koreans migrated to China for employment and seeking 
fortunes, and many of them were upper middle class North Koreans. Also, there is steady increase in 
family reunifying type of migration, where the already settled North Koreans in Korea brings their rest 
of family members in either North Korea or China through the brokerage systems (Kwak, 2005: 48). 
These changes allowed Koreans and academia to further recognize and refer North Korean defecting 
residents as ‘North Korean migrants.’   
 
2) Demography and Characteristics 
 
 The demographic and social-background characteristics of North Korean migrants are 
becoming more diverse, and there has been steady increase in female and family-grouped North 
Korean migrants. Furthermore, there are about 30,000~50,000  overseas North Korean migrants, who 
are staying (or have stayed) in other countries for a longer period, and some of them are moving to 
Korea (Lee et al., 2003: 55). Among the few of overseas North Korean migrants migrating to Korea 
have married foreigners, and therefore, have brought characteristics of international/multicultural 
family with them. Also, the number of family invitation of North Korean migrants increased as well; 
the brokerage system that connects Korea, China and North Korea offers services of bringing the 
migrants’ family members with the cost of about 5,000,000~10,000,000 won (approximately 
$4,166~$8,333). This clearly shows the institutionalization of migration patterns.  
 Compared to past North Korean migrants, current ones are mostly falling behind in 
socioeconomic statuses. According to a survey of North Korean migrants by the Database Center for 
North Korean Human Rights (hereafter NKDB Center) in 2005, 29.0% of North Korean migrants had 
non-professional occupations, such as 18% students, 6% housewives, and 4.7% unemployed, while 
residing at North Korea. Among the migrants with professional occupations, 34.6% were laborers, 
followed by 7.3% farmers, 8.0% office workers, 2.4% managers, 2.4% artists or athletes, and 3.8% 
teachers or doctors (Y. Yoon et al., 2005). The proportion of residing in professional occupations was 
only 16.6%. Because they were mostly unemployed or simple-laborers while residing in North Korea, 
it is highly unlike for them to find professional jobs in Korea.  
 From examining North Korean migrants’ lifestyle and standard of living, only 11.1% were 
upper middle class, followed by 52.5% lower middle class, 26% lower class, and 7.8% the submerged 
tenth, which clearly shows the inadequate standard of living in North Korea and how it worked as a 
significant motive for migration. When viewed their educational levels, only 26.7% graduated from 
college or higher, while 62.1% received middle/high education. Furthermore, after they migrated to 
Korea, 73.6% never attended schools, and among the migrants, who have attended schools, 30.4% are 
currently enrolled in colleges and 19.3% are enrolled in middle schools. 
 The real problem with the North Korea migrants’ education is not the level of education 
received but the level of quality, contents, and compatibility with Korean education. North Korea 
migrants, who are used to North Korea’s central idea (Juche Idea), face difficulties in adapting the idea 
of capitalism and its competitiveness. Also, 90% of the teenagers of North Korea migrants have missed 
out schoolings, which often later results in poor academic achievements, in North Korea and third 
countries during the process of migration and only 38% are enrolled in regular Korean schools. 
However, even the enrolled students are falling behind in Korean curriculum or are having difficulties 
in getting along with fellow students or teachers. The drop-out rate of North Korean migrant students is 
about 13.7%, which is 10 times higher than the Korean students’ drop-out rate (Ministry of Education 
& Human Resources Development, 2004). By reviewing North Korea migrants’ backgrounds of 
educational level, occupation, and statuses, it can be concluded that their quality of human capital is 
quite low, and therefore, they are most likely to be marginalized and disadvantaged in Korea’s labor 
markets. 
  
3) Current Situations and Problems 
 
 According to several surveys and literature reviews dealing with North Korea migrants’ social 
adaptation to Korean societies, most of them face difficulties in economic adaptation, which is the most 
basic phase of social adaptation. Out of the currently economic active population, 30~40% are 
unemployed, and most of the employed population reside upon temporary positions or part-time jobs in 
manual labor or personal service industries. More than 60% of North Korean migrants are reported to 
depend on government aid of living expenses, and they face difficulties in human relations mainly due 
to language barriers and differences in values and beliefs (Yoon, 2009). They heavily depend on mass 
media, such as TV, radios and videos, for leisure activities, and have limited access to productive 
activities, hobbies, or learning/self-development activities (Cho, Park, and Hong, 2008: 14). The 
defectors with no friends or family in South Korea also lack social network, which ultimately leaves 
them out from access to opportunities and information. Except through churches and related activities, 
North Korea migrants do not have other major social gatherings or organizations. They are thus 
unavailable to have primary relationships with Koreans, and ends up befriending their fellow migrants. 
North Korea migrants also face difficulties in psychological adaptation; negative bias and stereotypes, 
and discriminations toward North Korea migrants are the key factors of making them difficult in 
adapting and socializing in a career and social life. Their health is generally in poor condition, and the 
rate of chronic illness and disease is much higher than that of South Korean residents. Their poor health 
makes it difficult for them to seek employment and other normal socioeconomic activities (I. Yoon, 
2007: 80). 
 
IV. Searching for Coexistence 
 
 Foreign residents in Korea comprise of only 2.4% of the Korean population and the 
percentage of long-term foreign residents is even lower. Therefore, one can say it is premature to call 
Korean society a multicultural society. Yet, the number of foreigners and the level of racial and 
ethnical diversity keep growing, and therefore, it is undeniable that Korean society is slowly 
transforming into a multicultural society. Low fertility and aging will reduce the total population, 
especially the economically active population and it would be inevitable Korea to admit more foreign 
labor force in order to keep up with the current level of economic growth and living standards. 
Furthermore, in addition to migrant workers, marriage migrants and foreign students enter Korea in 
increasing numbers and many of them manage to settle permanently. As a result, Korean society will 
become more diverse in terms of race, ethnicity, and culture, and achieving social integration out of 
diversity has become the major task for Korean society. In a situation like this, multiculturalism is 
thought to be an unavoidable choice as an ideology and policy of multicultural coexistence among 
various multicultural groups. In other words, it is not about whether to accept immigrants or not, but is 
about to allow which immigrants and how to facilitate their incorporation into society. Also, it is not 
about whether to accept multiculturalism or not, but is about to what kind/form of multiculturalism will 
be implemented. Therefore, our next discussion of multiculturalism should go beyond theoretical 
discourses and step toward seeking solutions to concrete and actual problems of a multicultural society. 
 One concrete action plan is to discard compassionate and naïve thinking and viewpoints of 
multiculturalism that seem prevalent among ordinary Koreans at this point and to pay attention to and 
prepare potential risks and conflicts that a multicultural society can bring in. We need to learn a lesson 
from Western countries that used to admit large numbers of immigrants and now suffer from racial and 
religious conflicts when the second generation of immigrants rebel against the majority group’s 
prejudice and discrimination against them. Koreans seem to be tolerant and sympathetic toward 
immigrants because they are not numerous and threatening yet.  When their number gets bigger and 
they compete with natives and resist assimilation to mainstream culture, it is likely that Koreans’ 
attitudes toward immigrants become sour and negative so rapidly. In order to prepare for these 
phenomena, Korean society needs to improve its acceptability of multiculturalism and create 
environments where multicultural minorities can feel they are equal and productive members of a 
society. It also needs to develop consistent principles to respond to such concrete and realistic problems 
as whether to allow Muslim immigrants, because of their religious devotion, to wear Hijabs in the 
public arena. 
 Multicultural coexistence between the majority and minority groups requires both attitudinal 
changes of people and systematic changes of laws and institutions. I will first propose 
recommendations for systematic changes and second an alternative principle of social solidarity and 
integration for a multicultural society. 
 First, the minimum and the most basic condition of multiculturalism is to abolish all kinds of 
discrimination and social exclusion and provide all people with equal opportunities for self-
development. Thus, we need to expand and strengthen the existing the Prohibition Act on 
Discrimination to prohibit any mistreatment and discrimination against multicultural minority groups.    
 Second, we need to go beyond the passive protection of basic human rights that prohibits 
discrimination against minorities and step toward the active protection of human rights that guarantees 
both social and cultural rights of cultural minority groups. From this standpoint, when children of 
multicultural family face learning difficulties at school, we need to acknowledge their right to receive 
special education tailored to meet their needs and characteristics and to require the government to 
provide funding and manpower for these children. 
 Third, we need to find realistic solutions to the problems of undocumented foreign residents 
who are actual members of Korean society and living residents of local communities. They are stuck in 
a blind spot of human rights protection with little basic human rights like education and medical care 
because they are not Korean citizens, compatriots and of legal status. We need to develop plans of 
legalization by which we set qualifications and conditions of legalization, select qualified ones, give 
them conditionally legal status for a certain period of time (e.g., 5 years), and then change their status 
to permanently legal status after they prove their ability of self-sufficiency and contribution to society. 
We can benchmark the precedents in the United States to develop the Korean model of legalization of 
undocumented migrants.  
 Attitudinal changes of people are more difficult to occur and require long-term investment in 
education and training. Thus, we need to expand and strengthen multicultural education not only for 
migrants but also ordinary Koreans so that they learn multicultural values, lifestyles, and modes of 
behavior and practice them in their everyday lives. 
 Finally, we need to develop a new principle of social solidarity and integration suitable for a 
multicultural society. As explained earlier, relationships between Koreans and multicultural minority 
groups are determined largely by whether they are Korean nationals or not, compatriots or not, and 
legal foreigners or not. South Koreans apply the principle of national to naturalized marriage migrants 
and their children, the principle of compatriot to overseas Koreans, and the principle of legality to 
foreigners. Naturalized marriage migrants and their children become the target of inclusion and 
assimilation. Overseas Koreans receive preferential treatment over non-Korean foreigners. Legal 
foreigners are protected from discrimination and receive support for social adjustment and economic 
activities while illegal or undocumented ones are excluded from social support and protection. 
These group-specific principles are inconsistent and discriminatory and thus not appropriate to become 
the principle of coexistence among peoples of different cultural backgrounds in a multicultural society. 
Thus, there is a need for a more universal and inclusive principle of social integration that can be 
applied to all actual members of a multicultural society.  
Ethnicity and ethnic nationalism used to be the principle of social solidarity and the driving 
force that united South Koreans in times of national crises. It is no longer valid in recent times, 
however, when the territory, ethnicity, culture, and nationality do not coincide (Befu, 2001). 
Nationality (or citizenship) and civic nationalism are more effective than ethnicity and ethnic 
nationalism to incorporate such naturalized foreigners as marriage migrants and their children into 
South Korean society. They are not, however, applicable to overseas Chinese who are permanent 
members of Korean society and other sojourning foreigners. Moreover, undocumented foreigners who 
constitute a sizable portion of foreigners do not receive the basic protection of human rights because 
Korean laws like the Foreigners Treatment Act and the Ordinance to Support Resident Aliens protect 
only legal foreigners. 
In order to acknowledge all actual members of a multicultural society and provide them with 
minimum protection of human rights, I propose that we need to adopt the principle of residence and 
cohabitation as the principle of multicultural coexistence. By the principle of residence and 
cohabitation, foreigners and migrants are acknowledged as residents and living people of local 
communities and are entitled to basic human rights regardless of legal status. All multicultural minority 
groups are cohabitants of South Koreans who share the residence and have interdependent relationships. 
The concept of cohabitation is similar to the concept of denizenship proposed by Soysal (1994). Soysal 
argues that the restructure of citizenship from particularistic national to universalistic postnational 
citizenship has its roots in the post-WWII period when a new legal arrangement, also called as 
denizenship, came into being for labor migrants and guestworkers. The guestworkers in Germany and 
France, who have resided in countries for years, have obtained civil and social rights, regardless of 
their nationality. It is true that denizenship does not allow political participation, and therefore 
represents a legal status to be located between being alien and being a citizen (Joppke, 2010: 33). 
However, it can still provide long-term aliens with social rights and opportunities to participate as 
productive members of host society and work as a rational transitional procedure of normalizing the 
status of long-term aliens by naturalization. In that sense, cohabitation and denizenship can work as 
middle-range principles of multicultural coexistence before South Koreans still imbued with strong 
nationalism adopt universalistic postnational citizenship.  
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